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Sub-national governance in post-RAMSI Solomon Islands 
 
Debra McDougall 
University of Western Australia 
 
Over the past decade, RAMSI has stabilized the state in Solomon Islands, but 
many basic problems of governance remain. Among the most pressing is the 
failure of the state to effectively engage with and deliver services to the rural 
people who comprise the majority of the population. Since the colonial era, 
underfunded administrations have struggled to govern these geographically 
dispersed islands, but many ordinary citizens and public servants feel that 
subnational government functioned better twenty or thirty years ago than it 
does today, even after ten years of intensive statebuilding. Frustration about 
failure of subnational govrnment is felt widely and deeply in Solomon Islands, 
but recent attempts to address this failure, which have included a dramatic 
expansion of development funds administered directly by Members of 
Parliament, have arguably made the situation worse.  
 
Such challenges were the focus of a roundtable discussion held during the 
"Solomon Islands in Transition" workshop at the Australian National University 
(4-6 November 2013) with senior Solomon Islands public servants and 
academics from Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, and beyond. A 
core message that emerged from that conversation was that in this critical 
period of transition, the most important thing that the Australian government 
and other members of the international community can do is help Solomon 
Islanders reverse a recent history of defunding and dismantling the institutions 
of subnational government. 
 
Daily challenges 
 
Some of the most intractable problems of sub-national governance are 
relatively simple in nature. They include a lack of access to reliable 
transportation, understaffing, and the centralization of key staff positions and 
institutional functions in Honiara. Participants in the roundtable noted that it 
was easier for medical personnel, magistrates, and police to tour before a 
government marine unit was eliminated in the 1990s because that unit 
allowed different departments to share fuel costs and travel by the marine 
unit’s small ship rather than inefficient motorized canoe. Acquisition of 
supplies also became more difficult with the elimination of subtreasury offices 
in the late 1990s. In theory, supplies like stationary and fuel are regularly 
provided from Honiara, but supplies often run short and delays are frequent. 
Acquiring non-recurrent supplies can take months. If a police outboard motor 
is missing a spark plug, for example, the officer in charge must request it 
directly from the Ministry of Police in Honiara, which requests funds from the 
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National Treasury, which often takes more than two weeks to respond before 
the spark plug can be purchased and shipped. Such are everyday frustrations 
for public servants in the provinces.  
 
Like transportation, understaffing is a perenniel problem in all government 
departments. This is nowhere more noticeable than in the justice system. As 
former Deputy Chief Magistrate Emma Garo pointed out, the Solomon Islands 
has only seven magistrates to serve some 46 court circuit centers in nine 
provinces, and four of those seven are based in Honiara. Only one province 
(Malaita) has a principle magistrate who can hear cases independently; the 
others rely on visits from Honiara-based principle magistrates during regular 
circuit tours, which are frequently cancelled when a magistrate is unavailable 
(see Allen et. al 2013: 50 for an example from Isabel Province). Staff 
shortages challenge the court even in Honiara: in late 2013, the country’s 
Chief Magistrate revealed that acute staff shortages may force even the 
Honiara Magistrate’s Court to shut temporarily (Buchanan 2013). Attempts to 
to recruit more magistrates have been unsucessessful because pay and 
conditions are not attractive to talented professionals.  
 
The police and justice sectors have been a major focus of RAMSI’s state 
building efforts. Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Police Edmond Sikua 
highlighted the urgent need for more extensive police engagement with local 
communities. He suggested that the most serious challenge to policing is the 
absence of a functional court systems on the local level. Even if police could 
respond effectively to complaints, without access to justice through the courts, 
people become frustrated and may take the law into their own hands. Emma 
Garo noted that almost all of RAMSI’s efforts in the justice system have been 
focused on high-profile criminal cases. Reform efforts have been a ‘miserable 
failure’ in terms of connecting people with the justice system. When conflicts 
exceed the capacity of local church or customary leaders to solve and 
disputants do not have the means to access higher level courts, they have the 
potential to become violent.i   
 
The dismantling of subnational government and the rise of constituency 
development funds 
 
Many discussions of subnational government today are focused on two 
controversial issues: the need for constitutional reform and the growth of 
constituency development funds. While such discussions are important, they 
may divert attention away from the more basic problem. In the years 
preceding the ethnic tensions, existing institutions of subnational government 
were systematically defunded and dismantled.  
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On paper, Solomon Islands has a system of government that can link rural 
people to the state. The Provincial Government Act of 1981, as revised in 
1997, provides the legislative basis for provincial government and empowers 
provincial government to create local-level government, which took the form of 
Area Councils.  The Solomon Islands has a three-tier legal system comprised 
of a Court of Appeal, a High Court, and magistrates courts. Local courts, 
which evolved out of colonial era native courts, are informal courts with limited 
criminal and civil juridiction that are supposed to be the initial entry to the 
justice system for ordinary villagers. In practice, however, none of the lower 
levels of the legislative, executive, or judicials systems have been functioning 
since the 1990s.  
 
The demise of local-level government and courts cannot be understood 
outside of the explosion of logging on customary land that began in the 1980s 
and has continued to the present. Logging related land disputes and 
applications for timber rights quickly overwhelmed the limited capacity of local 
courts and local area councils. Instead of seeking to strenghten these 
institutions, in the mid-1990s, national politicians essentially dismantled them 
with the support of a donor community focused on eliminating government 
waste. Area councils were defunded in 1993 and disbanded between 1996 
and 1997. Local courts still exist around the country and are allocated funding 
in the national government, but almost none ever meet to hear cases.  
 
Provincial government could provide the link between rural people and the 
national state, but relationship between provincial and national government 
has never been clear or consistent (Cox and Morrison 2004). Constituents 
often expect provinces to deliver services for which they are not responsible; 
many functions that provinces are tasked with undertaking are inadequately 
funded. In our discussion, James Habu (Premier of Isabel Province) and 
Jackson Kiloe (Premier of Choiseul Province) argued that members of the 
Provincial Assembly are close enough to the people to know what they expect, 
but the Provincial government rarely has the funds to meet those 
expectations. ii As with other aspects of subnational governance, Provinces 
have not returned to levels of capacity they enjoyed prior to the civil crisis of 
1998-2003, when a cash-strapped national government slashed annual grants 
to the Provinces and closed provincial substations of national ministries.  
 
The declining capacity of subnational government has been accompanied by 
the increasing importance of funds administered directly by Members of 
Parliament, now called Constituency Development Funds (CDF) (Fraenkel 
2010). Prior to the 1993 national elections, Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni 
granted each Member of Parliament SBD $100,000 as a “special discretionary 
fund”; these discretionary funds grew steadily under the governments of Hilly, 
Mamaloni, and Ulufa’alu. The funds dipped sharply after the 2000 coup, but 
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has grown dramatically since 2003, financed primarily by Taiwan. During his 
second term in 2006-7, Manaseh Sogavare expanded the CDF to nearly $1 
million for each of the country’s 50 constituencies, framing it as a general 
model of service delivery (Fraenkel 2010: 311-315). In March 2013, the Lilo 
government passed a bill that formalized the management of CDF and laid 
the ground for a further dramatic increase to nearly $6 million per constituency.  
 
Some within the donor community view CDF as a form of corrupt patronage 
politics, a mechanism that allows politicans to buy votes at election time with 
cash, bags of rice, and roofing iron. While politicians do use the money to 
secure votes, low rates of incumbent success suggest the strategy is not 
effective.iii Some Members of Parliament use the funds to provide important, 
but otherwise unavailable, services—modest support for hospitalized 
constituents, school fees, canoes and outboard motors, housing materials, 
and seed money for small-scale development projects. Such positive results 
do not, however, justify the recent expansion of CDFs from a small 
discretionary fund to a primary path for service delivery. This expansion is 
problematic for several reasons. 
 
First, an expanded CDF arguably breaches the constitutionally-mandated 
separation of legislative and executive powers by giving the MP direct 
responsibility for executing the function of the state that he has also legislated. 
The judiciary remains formally independent, but Emma Garo pointed out that 
if magistrates must request funds from Members of Parliament to undertake a 
circuit court in provincial regions, the independence of the judicary is also 
compromised.  
 
Second, CDF funds tend to benefit individuals and families rather than 
communities, arguably undermining investment in public goods and 
exacerbating inequality in rural areas. One participant observed that in her 
home village, since CDF funds have been used to purchase iron roofing and 
water tanks for individual households, the village water supply has fallen into 
disrepair. This outcome is not necessarily the fault of MPs; we know of 
several MPs who have tried to use CDF funds for large projects that would 
benefit communities rather than individuals or families, but have found that 
such projects are less appealing to consitutents that smaller, individualised 
handouts.   
 
Finally, the apparent efficiency of CDF as a mechanism for service delivery is 
an illusion. Outsiders may imagine that CDF money is distributed by Members 
of Parliament on regular visits to rural constituencies, but anyone who has 
lived in a village very long knows that this is rarely the case. Instead, villagers 
must make the expensive journey to Honiara and then wait for weeks to see 
their MPs. Sometimes transportations costs are nearly equal to the funds 
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requested. Other costs include the loss of productive labor in rural villages 
and the burden to urban families who must support their rural kin while they 
wait to see the MP or get their CDF money or goods. The costs of 
administrating the CDF are extremely high but invisible because they are 
borne by rural people not the state. 
 
The 2013 Constituency Development Funds Bill aimed to formalized the 
processes through which a greatly increased CDF would be disbursed. Each 
constituency is to have a Constituency Development Officer (CDO) and to 
compile a Constituency Development Plan. Those opposed to the act have 
pointed out that power remains entirely in the hands of the MP, who approves 
plans and appoints the CDO. In response to such criticism, the government 
has revised the legislation to provide for the establishment of Constituency 
Development Committees, not just officers and plans. It is not yet clear, 
however, how these committees will be chosen, whether they will be broadly 
representive, or how 50 Constituency Development Plans will be coordinated 
with the overall National Development Plan. The form of constituency-level 
administration that is now being implemented in the name of accountability 
promises to be as inefficient as earlier forms of local government like Area 
Councils, but without any semblance of democratic representation. 
 
Solutions  
 
Despite widespread popular demand for political decentralization, the post-
colonial era has seen strong interests collude to concentrate money and 
power in Honiara. Responsibility for the problem lies not only with Solomon 
Islands politicians, who are frequently derided by local people and outsiders 
alike for greed and corruption. Nor does it lie entirely with rural consitutents, 
who tend to put individual interests above the national good. Donors and 
international partners must also take some responsibility for the situation, 
insofar as they encouraged downsizing and centralization in the name of 
efficiency in the 1990s. Moreover, donors have sometimes sought to bypass 
the national ministries and provincial governments in efforts to work more 
directly with rural communities. Such approaches have helped to suck 
capacity away from the state, especially those branches of the state that are 
closest to rural people.   
 
Rather than seeking to bypass existing state institutions, international actors 
should seek to work through existing national ministries, help re-invigorate 
existing provincial governments, and assist in re-instating some form of 
democratic government on the local level. Only if the basic institutions of the 
state are strengthened on the subnational level can public servants do their 
jobs and serve rural people. Some efforts have been undertaken, notably 
through the UNCDF/UNDP Provincial Government Strengthening Program, 
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though such programs often seem to flounder insofar as they focus on 
building the capacity of actors within the system, rather than addressing the 
structural problems that make it impossible for capable individuals to do their 
jobs.  
 
While solutions to these serious challenges will require far more consulation, 
as a starting point, the following suggestions emerged from our discussion:  
 
• As a matter of urgency, the justice system must be expanded so that 
ordinary people have access to local or magistrates courts. While informal 
structures of justice within rural communities are remarkably functional in 
the absence of any courts or policing, they are currently at a breaking 
point.  
• In order to further expand policing into rural areas, area constables or 
some other form of intermediary should be re-introduced on a ward level to 
help translate local concerns to government actors and government 
agendas to local communities.  
• Consideration should be given to the re-introduction of some form of 
constituency-level representative bodies that could engage not only with 
the Member of Parliament (as Constituency Development Comittees are 
now supposed to do under the new CDF legislation) but also with the 
provincial government, national ministries, and external actors.  
• Subtreasury units of national ministries should be re-instated to facilitate 
the functioning of all sectors of government in provinces.  
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i Sikua and Garo discuss justice and policing post-RAMSI with Sinclair Dinnen in an ANU College of the Asia and the Pacific podcast here: http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/news-events/podcasts/justice-and-policing-solomon-islands-post-ramsi (accessed 14 December 2014).  ii Habu and Kiloe discuss Provincial Government after RAMSI in more detail with Sinclair Dinnen in an ANU College of the Asia and the Pacific podcast here:  
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http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/news-events/podcasts/provincial-government-solomon-islands-post-ramsi (accessed 14 December 2013). iii Fraenkel (2010) argues that these funds are more important in holding together 
fragile Parliamentary coalitions than keeping individual Members of Parliament in 
office. He suggests that the major problem with the CDF and other politician-
allocated funding in the region is not that it entrenches clientism on the local level, but 
that it means that available money that could be for building desperately needed 
infrastructure are siphoned into these inefficient funds. 
10 
 
                                                                                                                                            
